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1.  Introduction 
 The design of an effective legal compliance system for an organization fearing 
prosecution for white-collar crime or regulatory violations requires skill at predicting 
human behavior.  The surveillance portion of compliance involves estimates about who is 
most likely to misbehave, and when.  The communicative aspect—training and guidance—
requires thinking about what kinds of messages and incentives are most effective.  Forensics 
and resolution are about, at least in part, learning from the experience and applying the 
lessons to future activity. 
 It is entirely plausible to use the economist’s simplifying assumptions of rational 
choice and pecuniary self-interest in making these predictions. But the realism of these 
assumptions has been under attack for decades now (see Kahneman 2011), suggesting that 
we should at least consider more nuanced behavioral possibilities when designing and 
implementing compliance programs.    Psychologists observe that people tend to cheat less 
than they might get away with, even when assured of no possibility of detection and a sure 
financial gain.  At the same time, they cheat more than they should as an ethical matter, for 
reasons that are a complex mix of dispositions, cognitive frames and situational influences.  
A rapidly growing body of cognitive research is shedding light on when, how and why 
wrongdoing occurs.  At the same time, sociologists stress the cultural dimension to 
compliance-related behavior, urging that we look outside the individual mind for what 
drives compliance or noncompliance with law.  To be sure, all of this makes compliance-
related predictions much more contingent and messy, especially since there is no simple 
model to invoke and the research is very much a work in progress.1  The hope, however, is 
that these insights can make the predictions be more accurate. 
 The label “behavioral compliance” can be attached to the design and management 
of compliance that draws from this wider range of behavioral predictions about individual 
                                                 
1  In a recent book, I extend this analysis to the task of securities regulation generally.  Langevoort, 2016. 
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and organizational behavior.2  Like conventional economics, it understands that incentives 
matter.  Indeed, a core portion of work in the psychology of ethical choice explains how 
and why people can behave selfishly or cheat but do not construe their own behavior as bad 
or wrong. For if that is so, their (or their team’s) moral compass becomes unreliable as a 
matter of self-regulation, a particularly frustrating insight in the compliance realm:  good 
people doing bad things.   
 This chapter surveys some of the contemporary research in what has become 
known as behavioral ethics,3 and its relevance to compliance.  This connection is by no 
means new: for the last twenty-five years or so, researchers interested in managerial and 
organizational behavior have tapped into the psychology of good and bad moral choices to 
suggest how companies might manage their legal and reputational risks.  By now, they 
seem to have agreed that ethics is an essential building block for both legal compliance and 
enterprise risk management.  Lawyers have taken note (Killingsworth, 2012).    
2.  Behavioral Ethics and Compliance 
 Research in behavioral ethics uses “cheating” as its key word to describe what good 
ethics is not, and treats illegal behavior as an especially troubling form of cheating.  Many 
of the field’s insights relate directly to legal matters.  Furthermore, the line between law 
and ethics is very fuzzy, so that good ethics are a worthy goal within compliance regardless 
of how a prosecutor or defense lawyer might characterize some accusation.  In that sense, 
behavioral ethics research is perfectly in synch with compliance programs that seek to be 
values-based (see Tyler et al. 2008; Tyler 2017), rather than command and control.  The 
connections between ethics and compliance are also important to the debate about the 
optimal balance of emphasis between law and ethics and on which corporate actors (e.g., 
lawyers or compliance officers) have ultimate authority over these matters (Treviño et al. 
1999, p. 146; Langevoort 2012, pp. 499-502)).   
 We know from surveys of compliance officers that ethics is a potentially 
uncomfortable subject in organizations (Treviño et al. 2014a).  People tend to think of 
themselves as ethical, and that ethical dispositions have been formed via religion, education 
and the broader culture. That provokes some level of defensiveness when the subject 
comes up in the workplace.  One of the eye-openers in using behavioral ethics is how easily 
people take to psychological explanations when analyzing the riskiness of other peoples’ 
unethical behaviors, as it then gradually dawns on them that they could not possibly be 
                                                 
2   In the interest of limited time and space, this chapter leaves to others discussions of structural sources on 
blind spots in compliance, such as the diffusion or “siloing” of information.  For a broader perspective, see 
Miller and Rosenfeld, 2010. 
 
3   For book-length treatments of behavioral ethics for a general audience, see Ariely, 2012, and Bazerman 
and Tenbrunsel, 2011.  There are many literature reviews for academics.  E.g., Bazerman and Gino, 2012, 
and Treviño et al., 2014b.    
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immune to the same forces.  That is key to ethical self-awareness, in compliance and 
otherwise. 
 To repeat the punch line for behavioral ethics: people cheat less than they could 
get away with, but more than they should.  The first part of that insight is heartening. 
There is indeed a great deal of pro-social behavior—loyalty, cooperation, 
conscientiousness—because people want to think of themselves in such a light, and want 
others to think of them similarly.  Whether this is biological or learned behavior is deeply 
disputed.  Certainly there are evolutionary advantages in species that suppress selfishness, 
and economists have long pointed out the value of a reputation for trustworthiness.  No 
complex organization could work well without a baseline of mutual trust, and much of the 
theory of corporate culture involves taking advantage of these inclinations to build loyalty 
at the group level (Akerlof and Kranton 2005).  For most people, it is good to be part of a 
team, something bigger than oneself (Kluver et al. 2014). 
 From a compliance standpoint, however, that is a mixed blessing.  Precisely the 
same forces that create internal bonding make it more likely—especially in the face of 
competition and rivalry—that the cohesion will work to displace empathy and justify 
aggressive behavior against perceived outsiders (Cikara et al. 2014).  In business, those 
“others” can not only be competitors, but the government, customers and even other units 
within the firm that are viewed as threats to the group’s interests and identity.  One of the 
most potent incentives to cheat is in service of others: altruistic cheating (Ariely 2012, pp. 
222-23).  Corporate agents have ample room to rationalize compliance failures in the name 
of loyalty. 
 That also happens on an individual cognitive level, and takes us to the dark side of 
the punch line: in general (but with many exceptions) people cheat more than they should.  
There are now many psychology experiments built on a simple platform, testing the 
inclination to cheat in circumstances were detection and punishment is impossible.  A 
common form is to give subjects a somewhat challenging matrix-based computation test 
(Ariely 2012, pp. 11-22).  The test is given to a control group and is externally graded, 
thus giving investigators the ability to see what honest performance is over a large number 
of subjects.  The same test is then given to subjects who grade themselves. These subjects 
are told to shred their exams immediately after grading and report the score to an 
administrator, who will give (real) money based on the number of questions that were 
correct.  The control group scores average around 4 out of ten.  Under non-detection 
conditions, self-graders claim around 6.  An obvious question, among others, is why not 
10, which maximizes utility?  
 There are different possible answers (e.g., people would feel ashamed when 
observed claiming 10, because that seems like obvious cheating), but at least illustrates 
some form of ethical self-control.  But then why not be completely honest?  One common 
interpretation is that people will cheat out of temptation, but only to a point where they 
can maintain a self-image as a non-cheater.  If the mind can somehow rationalize the act as 
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acceptable (e.g., I wrote down the wrong digit, or I knew the right answer, or I’m really 
better at math than this), it self-justifies the cheating.  While the shredder tests are fairly 
objective, you can see how much more easily this could occur in the face of subjective 
standards for right and wrong. 
 The basic insight is that motivated inference allows people to maintain self-image 
while pursuing self-interest more aggressively—but to a limit.  From there, behavioral 
ethics asks when, why and how this sort of rationalized self-interest occurs.  
Experimentally, what manipulations might make cheating more or less likely?  That is 
where the most interesting results come in terms of compliance, because answers that 
describe real-life behaviors in the field might give compliance officials a better opportunity 
to predict and deter law-related cheating behaviors where such forces might be especially 
likely.   
 We will turn to these stress points shortly.  But within this research program, one 
major question dominates and is not yet fully understood (Feldman 2014).  How much of 
this cognitive activity is unconscious?  For the shredder experiments, the “excuses” listed 
above seem fairly conscious ones, designed to justify the cheating.  We are all familiar with 
our own (sometimes pathetic) efforts to resolve guilt via excuse-making, which sometimes 
work to normalize the activity but not so as to make awareness of the troubling act or 
omission disappear entirely.   
 What the research suggests is that self-serving inference results from cognitive 
activity that operates along a broad spectrum.  Some is perceptual, so that we may not see 
the problem (we see only what we want to see).  Some is interpretive, so that we fail to 
perceive ethically relevant cues.  Hence, the ethical or legal risks are simply not processed 
as such.  As we move further along the spectrum, we start coming to something that might 
be described as awareness, but still subject to interpretation and shading that deflect the 
sense that something is seriously wrong—the more familiar sort of rationalization or 
normalization.    
 In other words, there are cognitive buffers that delay awareness of what is ethically 
or legally problematic, and maybe prevent it from ever fully being realized.  Timing is key.  
Consequences flow from the unlawful or unethical actions or omissions, and those choices 
may be made without sufficient awareness or appreciation of the risk.  If so, neither carrots 
nor sticks work as we would hope or expect because the person is not aware that the action 
taken falls within the category of unlawful or unethical conduct to which the reward-
penalty system applies.  And once the crucial steps are taken, responsibility is locked in.  If 
the person later comes to sense that what was done was wrong, the psychological reaction 
is defensive bolstering or cognitive dissonance (adjusting beliefs to justify the action), or a 
more active cover-up.  To use a phrase from a classic in social psychology relating to the 
escalation of commitment, when adequate awareness comes the person is already “knee 
deep in big muddy” (Staw1976). 
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 Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel (2011, chapter 4) describe this temporal 
dimension to wrong-doing in three phases.  The first is anticipatory, and is the domain of 
good intentions.  People genuinely intend and expect to behave well.  But people are 
notoriously bad at self-prediction.  At the time of temptation, the mind goes to work in the 
ways just described: blurring, misperceiving, reconstituting so that the preferred outcome 
is privileged.  Some call this “ethical fading” (Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004), because the 
ethical dimension to the choice is deflected and put out of awareness.  After the act the 
mind restores the original self-image, through rationalization, motivated forgetting, 
compensation or other mechanisms.   
 What we are describing is hardly unfamiliar; these are “blind spots” in which ego 
(or greed, fear, desire, etc.) gets in the way of good judgment.  Scientific progress—today 
heavily focused on the neuroscience—lies in understanding how and why blind spots thrive 
and persist.  That is an evolutionary question, and gets us to whether and why this 
tendency might be adaptive.   
There are a number of intriguing hypotheses.  Robert Trivers (2011) has long 
argued that success (survival) within species depends to some extent on the ability to 
deceive others who pose threats.  But precisely because of the frequency of deception, 
others learn to detect it from small, subtle “tips and tells” like shifty eyes, etc.  A person 
can avoid providing these signals if he has distorted the truth in his own mind sufficiently to 
believe that he is not being deceptive or otherwise unethical.  To deceive others, in others 
words, we first deceive ourselves.   
Self-deception, in turn, often takes the form of excessive confidence or optimism.  
Biologists have developed fairly intricate explanations for why each of these is a survival 
trait in large populations, even though the dangers might be self-evident (Johnson and 
Fowler 2011, Sharot 2011).   
From a compliance perspective, this raises the uneasy possibility not only that self-
deception as to legal and ethical risk is commonplace, but that it might be especially 
common among the most successful people in the organization—the survivors of the 
Darwinian promotion tournaments that operate as the pathways to influence and power.  If 
strong ethics and compliance initiatives are resisted in many organizations—which seems 
to be the perception among compliance professionals—that may be one reason why.  
Compliance norms threaten beliefs, behaviors and cultural tropes that are instinctively 
success-producing.  We will come back to power issues later in the chapter; for now at 
least be aware of one researcher’s claim that power itself makes people better liars (Carney 
2010). 
3.  Cheating More 
 The experimental studies described in the prior section set in motion wide-ranging 
inquiries into what dispositional or situational factors make cheating more or less likely.  In 
6 
 
the laboratory, this can be tested by manipulating one potential factor while holding 
everything else constant, and the volume of such studies is now large (Bazerman and Gino 
2012).  But contemporary research is hardly limited to that particular experimental design, 
especially because it has become recognized that ethics can be viewed as a form of risk-
taking, and judgment and decision-making in the face of risk is a much larger project in 
psychology from and to which insights might be derived.  For legal compliance, it is 
especially noteworthy that self-serving inference is indeed facilitated by ambiguity, either 
in the situational context or the ethical demand.  This strongly suggests that compliance-
related distortion will occur especially easily when the law is subjective rather than bright-
line (Feldman and Teichman 2009), as it so often tends to be.   
This section will review some of the influences said to make cheating behaviors 
more likely.  Because this field is large and growing larger, we have to be both brief and 
selective.  Readers wanting more can consult any of a number of literature reviews and 
meta-analyses (e.g., Treviño et al. 2014b, and studies cited therein).  Consistent with the 
primacy of psychology in behavioral ethics research, we will focus first on individual-level 
insights, even though it is generally agreed that social forces are almost always at work in 
serious instances of organizational misbehavior.   
3.1.  Loss Aversion 
 In studies of risky choice, one of the most famous insights is referred to as loss 
aversion, part of the Kahneman-Tversky heuristics and biases research under the heading of 
prospect theory (Kahneman 2011).  To be sure, rational people generally are risk averse.  
Loss aversion suggests that people become more risk preferring when faced with 
threatened loss of what they have, as compared to when faced with the opportunity to gain 
something of equal value.  This is so even where the loss versus gain is simply a matter of 
framing—whether a given outcome is viewed as a loss or a gain depends on the decision-
maker's reference point outcome. A famous illustration found different risk attitudes for a 
risky medical intervention based solely on whether the effort was described as avoiding 
deaths or saving lives.  Importantly, aspiration levels can divide the two domains, so that 
falling short of expectations is usually processed as a risk of loss.  This leads to a fairly 
intuitive prediction that goals and quotas—commonplace in many phases of a business—
can distort judgment especially as the goal is close but still out of reach.  Researchers have 
described this effect under the title “goals gone wild” (Ordóñez et al. 2009).   
 More generally, Rick and Loewenstein (2008) claim that “people who find 
themselves 'in a hole' from which they perceive that dishonest behavior provides the only 
apparent means of escape, a wide range of evidence suggests, are more likely to cheat, 
steal, and lie,” which they refer to as hypermotivation.  A business professor has collected 
58 instances of corporate fraud consistent with a prospect theory account in the face of 
weak internal controls, including the infamous “London Whale” fiasco suffered and then 
mishandled by J.P. Morgan Chase (Abdel-Khalik 2014; see also Arlen and Carney 1992 
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identifying a similar explanation for securities fraud).  Perhaps when we observe some 
person or team hitting “stretch” goals period after period, it should be a compliance red 
flag, not just the cause for celebration and reward pay-outs that it is in so many firms.  
3.2.  Conflicts of Interest and Truth-telling 
 Conflicts of interest create the incentive to act opportunistically notwithstanding 
some pre-existing obligation (ethical or legal) to another, and so are of special interest in 
both law and behavioral ethics.   
Regulation often seeks to dampen such conflicts, and a common legal strategy is 
required disclosure of the conflict, on the assumption that there will be more cautious 
assessment of the discloser’s behavior.  Researchers, however, have found two unintended 
consequences (Loewenstein et al. 2011).  Under certain circumstances, the rate of 
opportunism in laboratory experiments went up after disclosure, not down.  This seems to 
be motivational: more unconscious “moral wiggle room” (Dana et al. 2008) to justify the 
opportunism because the victim has fairly been warned of its likelihood.  Compounding the 
problem is that the victims became more trusting, not less (although this varied depending 
on how the disclosures were structured).  One theory is that when there is a pre-existing 
relationship between the parties so that trust is present, the potential victim 
overcompensates in response to the disclosure to assure the sender that the trust remains.   
 Patterns of communication can produce unethical behavior in other ways as well.  
Perhaps reflecting the common moral intuition that acts of omission are less blameworthy 
than acts of commission (on which there is plenty of psychology research in support), 
studies of what lawyers would call half-truths—and what the researchers called “artful 
paltering” (Rogers et al. 2014)—showed that people are more willing to cheat via saying 
something technically true but misleading than to lie affirmatively.   
3.3.  Depletion, Stress and Time 
 One of the most interesting findings is that, cognitively, being ethical is hard work.  
As a result it is subject to depletion over time (e.g., Welsh and Ordóñez 2014). Such 
forces as stress and tiredness (so common in the business setting) weaken the ability to 
resist, as can repetitive acts of goodness.  The assumption here is that being selfish is the 
more automatic process, which deliberation has to override, and that takes a cognitive toll.   
 Another commonly noted bias involves overweighting present benefits over future 
costs, which can be seen as a simple failure of will-power but also as a cognitive distortion.  
This “hyperbolic time discounting” has familiar effects of impulsivity, procrastination and 
an excessive focus on immediate rather than delayed consequences—all associated with the 
potential for wrong-doing when the threat of punishment is both uncertain and distant.4 
                                                 
4   In legal scholarship, Manuel Utset has done a great deal to show how these time-inconsistency biases 
generate unlawful behavior.  E.g., Utset (2013); see also Baer (2014). 
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3.4.  Slippery Slopes 
 Another of the fairly intuitive predictions is that the inclination to cheat grows one 
step at a time (e.g., Welsh et al. 2015).  In studies of criminal behavior and business 
disasters, we keep being reminded that so many stories of corrupt wrongdoing begin with 
something fairly small and relatively innocent.  This fits with much of what we have already 
covered.  If people are willing to step over the line only a bit, that line moves so that when 
another temptation comes along, the next small step over takes them further away from 
the baseline.  And so on.  Rationalizations that aided and abetted the original opportunism 
recursively become part of a new normal.   
 Note the connection between the first steps down the slippery slope and some of 
what we covered earlier.  A study of how companies get into trouble for accounting fraud 
discovered, not surprisingly, that one can trace backwards from the sizable falsifications 
that eventually led to detection to much smaller deceits earlier on (Schrand and Zechman 
2012).  But more interestingly, it found that those early steps correlated with indicators of 
managerial overconfidence and over-optimism.  That is to say, managers who were 
genuinely convinced of the company’s good prospects made more unrealistic judgments in 
accrual matters, presumably believing that this best captured the fair value of the company.  
But once there was a lock-in to that optimism, the managers resisted disconfirming 
information (self-serving inference) and so escalated their commitment to the rosy 
portrayal.  Gradually that became impossible to do within the bounds of accounting 
discretion and so became accounting fraud.   
 The slippery slope also sheds light on the temporal dimension to wrongdoing, how 
early one there may not even be full recognition of an ethical or legal issue—even as the 
first fateful steps are taken. Only later, if ever, is awareness of the misconduct able to 
break through the blind spots and rationalizations.  It need not be innocent at the 
beginning, however.  Interviews with white collar criminals do often describe a slippery 
slope but identify the first step as a moment of weakness—being pressured by a friend or 
colleague into a small (and thus easily rationalized) act of wrongdoing, unaware of how that 
one step makes it so much harder to say no when asked again (Free and Murphy 2015, p. 
44).  In broker-dealer regulation, for example, one common problem is forged client 
signatures on transactional or account paperwork.  Note how easy this is to start—you’re 
actually saving the client the time and hassle of signing the papers—and how readily a year 
or two later this can turn into forged signatures that misappropriate funds from the client’s 
account and into the broker’s hands. 
3.5.  Competition 
 That intense competition produces unethical behavior is another non-surprising 
finding.  Competition produces both the excitement of potential gain as well as the fear of 
loss, and so cheating goes up as the goal gets closer but you are a step behind.  Cheating is 
more likely when the competitor is a well-known rival, both because of the personal 
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emotions and the ease by which rationalizations can go to work—they would do it to us if 
they could, or it is just the way the game is played— (e.g., Pierce et al. 2013).  Many 
people have noted the common invocation of sports or military imagery in such settings.   
 Risk-taking of all sorts—ethical and otherwise—is associated with a cluster of 
traits that enhance competitive fitness, including a taste for excitement, a desire to 
dominate, and strong ego (Malhotra 2010).  It is easy, then, to speculate about a link to 
testosterone, which recent research in neuroscience tries to chase down.  In the investment 
world, there have been a number of studies on the dynamics between hormones and risk-
taking on trading floors (Coates 2012).  A study of corporate fraud found a positive 
correlation with evidence that the CEO had the facial structure typical of high testosterone 
individuals (Jia et al., 2014).  Ethically, high testosterone leads to a more utilitarian, ends-
justify-the-means stance (Carney and Mason 2010). 
 One obvious implication of all this is with respect to gender diversity, which is 
well studied in both risk-taking and behavioral ethics research.  On average, women are 
less competitive, less inclined toward risk, and less likely to cheat than men.  Many 
researchers thus believe that gender diversity in upper echelons of organizations and other 
locations of economic power is a crucial step toward better ethics and responsibility (van 
Staveren 2014).  This raises the much-debated problem, however, of whether women who 
self-select into highly competitive fields are substantially different from men along these 
dimensions.  A research paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
studied the testosterone levels of MBA students at the University of Chicago, and found the 
expected differences between men and women (Sapienza et al. 2009).  But that small 
segment of women who chose investment banking as a career had somewhat higher relative 
testosterone levels than even the men who were going into investment banking.  
Hopefully, successful efforts at diversity would alter the desirability of entering such 
occupations, and gradually change the cultural dynamics and expectations that today treat 
hyper-competitive fields as the domain of alpha males.    
3.6.  Cultures and Conformity 
 As noted earlier, one of the big interdisciplinary battles in the study of business 
wrongdoing is between psychologist and economists, on one hand, and sociologists on the 
other.  The latter tend to reject highly individualized explanations for good and bad 
behavior, in favor of memes, norms, culture.  According to sociologists, people act with 
consciousness constrained by cultural belief systems, and immense pressures to conform, 
which sometimes promotes group-level wrongdoing (Greve et al. 2010).   
 Social psychology mediates between the individual and collective extremes (Darley 
2005), and some conventional research psychologists are taking a greater interest in the 
neuroscience of “groupishness” (Kluver et al. 2014).  We have known for some time that 
groups moderate some cognitive biases, and exacerbate others.  Identities can strengthen in 
group settings, enhancing competitiveness, aggression and the inclination to cheat.  Earlier, 
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we discussed studies finding that cheating increases when done for the betterment or 
protection of someone else. It is not hard to see how the bonds of loyalty and team 
cohesion can embolden someone to take ethical risks that he or she might not undertake 
out of pure self-interest.  Perhaps the most classic experimental study in all of social 
psychology came from Stanley Milgram, who found a higher-than-expected willingness of 
subjects to inflict pain on others simply out of obedience to the orders of an authority 
figure.  There are many forces potentially at work here—denial of responsibility, 
conformity, escalation etc.—and many disturbing lessons to be considered as applied in 
hierarchical organizations.   
 Cheating is contagious; observing it by others makes it more likely the observer 
will then cheat, too (Ariely ch. 8).  In social networks, which are of special interest in 
business settings, well-positioned actors can amplify via retransmission what is observed 
into what seems normal. 
 Another cross-cutting idea of importance to ethics is legitimacy.  In terms of the 
willingness of people to obey the law in settings of relatively weak detection and 
prosecution, evidence suggests that people assess the legitimacy of the legal demands (Tyler 
et al. 2008).  If either individually or by reference to the prevailing corporate culture, 
those legal demands are denigrated rather than respected, compliance rates drop. We can 
hypothesize that those beliefs are adaptive, enabling aggressive risk-taking a lesser burden 
of doubt.  I have long believed that in highly regulated industries, the tendency of 
employees to view regulatory demands as imposed by mindless bureaucrats run amok is a 
defense mechanism that lets business get done, at the price of higher compliance risk.  
Cynical cultures therefore can be particularly dangerous from a compliance standpoint.  
Even without cynicism, the inclination within organizational cultures to interpret the law 
in a self-serving fashion increases compliance risk (Feldman 2014).5  Consistent with the 
survey evidence that the legitimacy of a compliance and ethics program is heavily contested 
within many organizations (Treviño et al. 2014a), a similarly pernicious form of self-
serving inference about internal compliance demands could be at work.   
3.7.  Identity and Environment 
 We have already tied much of the research in behavioral ethics to identity 
maintenance.  Identity issues are well-researched in both psychology and sociology, with 
even inroads into economics (Akerlof and Kranton 2005).  There is great utility in a 
positive identity, individually and organizationally.  But with strong professional identity 
comes heavy baggage.  Recently, some well-respected European researchers gave a version 
of the standard cheating experiment to large-firm bankers, divided into two groups.  In 
one, their identities as bankers were primed (i.e, the experimental conditions pointedly 
                                                 
5  How organizations (including compliance and human resource personnel) interpret the law is a distinct and 
fruitful subject of research in sociology as well.  E.g., Edelman and Suchman (1997). 
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reminded them of their profession).  In results reported in the prestigious scientific journal 
Nature (Cohn et al. 2014), the level of cheating was normal except in the priming 
condition, where it was higher.  The bankers’ identity itself, in other words, was the 
motivator to cheat.   
 Much could be going on here, of course.  The results are reminiscent of a series of 
experiments that measure pro-social and anti-social behavior (including cheating) by 
framing the experiments so as to prime certain attitudes or emotions.  In particular, the 
trappings of money and wealth—expensive cars, for example—will, when made salient, 
increase the likelihood of opportunism (Kouchaki et al. 2014).  “Banker” may trigger 
similar feelings, or simply bring to mind a workplace where ample cheating had recently 
been observed.   
 Apart from cultural or professional identity, researchers have identified e other 
effects in multi-person settings.  We have already seen the ability of loyalty to drive 
unethical behavior.  Not surprisingly, people cheat more if they can do so indirectly, as by 
having an agent cause the harm (Paharia et al. 2009).  Acting through agents (or other 
institutions) also mutes responsibility, thereby diminishing both guilt and third-party blame 
over acting selfishly (Bartling and Fishbacher 2012) and regret over negative outcomes of 
risky decisions (Arlen and Tontrup 2015).  
Motivated inference also affects monitors, who may have incentives to avoid seeing 
trouble—so they miss the danger signs.  Ethical misbehavior that occurs on the slippery 
slope is not only more likely to grow, but harder for others to detect precisely because it 
evolves so slowly (Gino and Bazerman 2009).  These latter observations also make the 
important point that research in behavioral ethics is relevant to the compliance function not 
only in the ways described above but because compliance monitors themselves have blind 
spots.   
4.  Behavioral Compliance 
 Most people find all the foregoing interesting and more or less intuitive.  The 
question is whether it is useful to those seeking to build a successful compliance program.   
There are a variety of potential concerns with relying on this research when 
designing a compliance program. Some are methodological, such as whether one can rely 
on experiments using ordinary people (or students) as subjects to design a compliance 
program for those in business. This is a fair concern, because lab results can easily be 
misconstrued and are sometimes misleading (researchers have their own behavioral biases 
and self-interests, after all).  I will leave these challenges to literature reviews, and simply 
note the volume of this work and that, increasingly, it involves professional subjects in the 
laboratory and field studies to confirm or refute experimental predictions.  All social 
science must be used cautiously, this included, in formulating practice and policy.  
12 
 
 The increasing interest in adaptive biases also helps justify using this learning in 
sophisticated business settings. We know that heuristics and biases do not always translate 
well when applied in settings that reward skill and savvy when mistakes are costly and there 
is opportunity to learn from experience.  But again, without undertaking to prove the 
point here, the case has been made in the best peer-reviewed journals that certain biases 
help people compete and win. Anecdotal observation suggests that the business world has 
more than its share of blind spots. 
 So if you are a compliance officer and want to take this learning seriously, how 
would you do so?  This question connects to the subject of organizational correctives, 
which has been of interest for some time.6  Many companies have shown an awareness of 
the risks of self-serving bias, and there are tactics to combat it.  Perhaps the best-known 
example is the practice of banks removing authority from the original loan officers to 
renegotiate or work out arrangements when a large borrower is nearing default.  
Otherwise, the loan officer is subject to an escalation of commitment, driven by the desire 
to justify the original decision.   
As this example shows, all organizational correctives are based on the particular 
challenge in question, compliance included.  For now, we’ll have to generalize, which is 
dangerous because compliance challenges vary greatly.  The template for a smart antitrust 
compliance program focused on potential cartel activity (Sokol 2014) poses different 
problems from the one a brokerage firm worried about financial advisers pushing 
unsuitable securities on naïve customers might put in place.   
4.1.  Communication 
 Compliance begins with effective communication (Killingsworth 2012), and many 
people—lawyers in particular, I think (other than trial lawyers)—are poor communicators 
even when their diction is exquisite.  They assume that others will understand and process 
what they mean to say, as long as they are clear enough.  But communication research 
stresses that what people hear and think is often very different from what the speaker says 
or intends.  Compliance messages are apt to be filtered through eyes, ears and brains that 
are skeptical, resentful or merely uninterested— and adept at self-serving interpretation.   
 A case study from the management literature illustrates (MacLean and Benham 
2010). A financial services firm was increasingly concerned that its insurance brokers might 
be churning policies—substituting an old one for a new one for a customer just to generate 
fees.  Regulators were making threatening noises about the practice, so it was a salient 
compliance issue.  The executive team sent reminders and notices, and to make clear its 
                                                 
6  Philip Tetlock (2000) notes in a fascinating article that there are wide variations in organizations about the 
validity of behavioral predictions and explanations, varying based on political ideology and cognitive style of 
the observer.  More conservative managers have less tolerance for complicated behavioral assessments, 
preferring a more authority-based assessment of blameworthiness. 
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seriousness, instituted a heightened compliance review of policy substitutions within 90 
days of each other.   
 That was presumably well-intentioned.  But the message as received was 
completely different.  The firm’s brokers were churning to some extent.  Performance and 
compensation expectations were fixed on that level of productivity, and so the brokers 
were threatened by these new compliance demands.  When the brokers saw the 90 day 
procedure, they decided management was not really serious, and soon, the churns were 
done in 91 days.  They were convinced among themselves that headquarters did not really 
want the profitable practices stopped given that their “solution” was such an easily evadable 
compliance procedure.  The brokers interpreted the whole situation as management 
winking: mere window-dressing designed to appease the regulators but not cut into 
productivity.  They acted accordingly, no doubt with an added dose of cynicism about 
regulators, as well.  The rate of churning went up.  Perhaps they were right, and 
management was not serious.  But this story doesn’t seem far-fetched as describing a 
poorly executed compliance initiative, and one that ultimately cost the firm greatly in legal 
costs and penalties. 
 Communication also involves timing, which is very tricky.  Remember that most 
people in the firm see themselves as ethical and responsible, without the intention to 
misbehave.  Ethical warnings and lessons delivered well in advance of temptation will be 
met with the mental mute button.  Behavioral ethics stresses the need to intervene very 
close to the time of the act or omission, but by no means after, and to offer constructive 
courses of action, not just warnings.  As to good intentions alone, there should candid 
recognition that they can, indeed, line the road to hell. 
 There is a fascinating illustration of good and bad timing.  Certifications are 
commonplace in the business world: promises that what was or is about to be said is true 
and complete.  One wouldn’t think that there is much difference as to when, but 
psychologists hypothesized that it did—that there would be more honesty when people 
promise to be truthful than when, after the fact, they promise that they have been truthful 
(Ariely 2012, pp. 48-51).  The intuition is that the advance certification (think about a 
witness being sworn in at trial) is a reminder in advance of ethical demands, and therefore 
more efficacious.  If the person is inclined to lie, confronting them after the fact with the 
need to promise that there were no lies will just produce more lying.  The researchers 
were able to convince an insurance company to do a randomized test with its customers, 
who were asked once each year how many miles they had driven (useful in rate-setting 
because of the risk associated with additional miles).  The only difference was the before or 
after certification instruction.  When forms came back that year, those who signed before-
the-fact reported, against interest, significantly (15%) more miles traveled than the after-
signers.   
 Encouraging whistle-blowing is a common strategy within compliance, and 
notoriously difficult to incentivize (see Engstrom 2017).  Norms of loyalty are immensely 
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powerful, as we’ve seen, and self-serving inference will often cut against forming the 
impression that a colleague is cheating.  Tone at the top and peer support seem crucial; as 
one set of commentators put it, “it takes a village” to have the right support and incentives 
for whistleblowers to act (Mayer et al. 2013).  And any whistleblower has to anticipate that 
the inferences from the message may be processed in a self-serving way, so that the 
rejection of the complaint is deemed justified (Sumanth et al. 2011).  More constructively, 
research on the psychology on whistle-blowing has found that the countervailing pressure 
generally comes from fairness outrage, which may give hints on how to frame the outreach 
programs to better elicit these acts (Waitz et al. 2013).   
4.2.  Surveillance 
 Another core aspect of compliance is internal surveillance.  Advances in 
information technology allow extraordinarily sophisticated real time and retrospective 
observation of activity within a firm, albeit at substantial cost.  Both hard data and soft 
clues—scrubbing e-mail traffic for words and phrases of a particular tone—can yield 
valuable compliance intelligence.  Although we are still distant from this point, it’s not 
hard to imagine the modern day compliance version of Jeremy Bentham’s prison 
“panopticon,” which sees everything without being seen.7   
 Short of that, all surveillance is necessarily risk-based, and behavioral ethics 
research can help inform what to look for.  Here again one size never fits all, and each 
compliance issue must be analyzed by breaking down the choice architecture of any 
sensitive decision to see who makes it, under what circumstances, when and how.  Once 
can then put the behavioral learning to work, looking for particular temptations (goals 
gone wild), especially in the form of loss frames.  Once again, sequentially high levels of 
success can be a red flag, especially if you can’t figure out how they did it. 
 This suggests that the use of big data analytical tools may permit compliance 
departments to predict misbehavior, based on the large scale analysis of prior failures and 
their precursors.  Such efforts indeed seem to be on the horizon.8  Given the rapidly 
growing body of research on the correlates with fraud and other forms of wrongdoing, one 
can readily imagine a behaviorally attuned program that seeks to identify markers as they 
point toward more intense motive and opportunity.  MIT economist (behavioral and 
otherwise) Andrew Lo (2016) has suggested that a linear factor model could eventually be 
constructed for each executive that estimates risk appetite at any given time, and which in 
the aggregate might depict the taste for risk in the firm as a whole, or in individual sub-
units. 
                                                 
7   The compliance-based reference to Bentham’s idea comes from Fanto, 2014, p. 1148. 
 
8  “J.P. Morgan Knows You’re a Rogue Trader before You Do,” Bloomberg Business, April 8, 2015. 
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 Three cautionary points have to be made.  First, as Lo points out, such artificial 
intelligence—surely helpful in at least allowing the centripetal processing of all available 
information about a persons and situations—would have to have the capacity to learn and 
evolve (Lo 2016).  People surely do, as the 91 day rule experience noted earlier shows.  
What happened in the past to produce misbehavior was the function of a set of 
interpersonal and situational forces that may be gone by the time the model is built.  The 
value-at-risk models in investment banks in the time leading up to the financial crisis did 
poorly precisely because the data inputs were from a time when housing prices rose 
consistently, because that had been the only available prior experience.  Second, any 
predictive software will inevitably generate a large number of false positives (and false 
negatives), which may lead to behaviors by those in charge of responding that are not 
optimal and leave hiding places about which people in the field gradually learn.   
 The third is a bigger point.  One of the central insights in behavioral economics is 
that people react poorly to close monitoring (Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  Heavy surveillance 
is a signal of distrust, which may produce less trustworthy behaviors in response to 
expectations.  Control has the ability to crowd out the kind of autonomy that invites ethical 
behavior,9 and can make people less entrepreneurial and productive (Tenbrunsel and 
Messick 1999).  Imagine a bank with a perfect panopticon.  Though I concede the 
experiment would be an interesting one, I would wager that over time its productivity and 
competitive position would lag behind peers with less surveillance intensity, even if its 
compliance record might be better (Langevoort 2002).  And given the capacity of complex 
human systems to frustrate even the best of plans, I’m not even sure about the compliance 
superiority.   
Values-based compliance and risk management is important, by most accounts, to 
success (Trevino et al. 1999; Tyler et al. 2008).  If so, the best systems invite intra-
organizational trust, even though the trust will sometimes be abused.  (I wish prosecutors 
and regulators understood this better, but suspect that the induced evolution of 
surveillance, technology-driven and otherwise, will steadily be in the direction of more 
intensity and less trust.)   
4.3.  Goals, Quotas and Compensation 
 The kind of work in behavioral ethics we have been surveying meshes with 
orthodox economics in agreeing that incentives matter.  Thus, it is probably safe to say that 
most all compliance failures happen because incentives pushed or pulled in that direction.  
The main difference between the psychologists and the economists on this is that the 
former see compliance choices as mediated by a state of mind that obscures perception and 
judgment in pursuit of self-interest, while the economist sees the actor as a nimble Bayesian 
                                                 
9  Related to this is the phenomenon whereby both promised rewards and threatened sanctions are “priced” 
and lead to more calculative behaviors where integrity is called for.  See Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000. 
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updater responding precisely to changing incentive cues.  As we have seen, that difference 
complicates the tasks of compliance and ex ante risk management. 
  The common ground on the matter of incentives means that conventional 
economic analysis of the incentive structure relating to any compliance setting is a good 
starting point, as a matter of parsimony if nothing else.  (My sense is that many compliance 
programs ignore both good economics and good psychology.)  From that base can be added 
the psychological and organizational twists to see how messages might be distorted in 
transmission or reception.  One of the famous examples in the compliance literature 
involves Sears and the financial and reputational penalties for overcharging customers for 
auto repair work (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011, p. 106).  Sears had been a leader in auto 
work, and had a good reputation for that and other customer services.  But firms like Wal-
Mart and K-Mart destabilized the retail marketplace via cost-cutting, and Sears suffered a 
loss of revenue.  To compete (perhaps to survive) Sears instituted more rigorous 
profitability targets that matched others in the industry.  Apparently to its surprise—but 
not to the surprise of any economist or psychologist—the shop floor reaction read that as a 
directive to ignore good customer service. On the shop floor, the redesigned incentive 
structure likely led to “seeing” more problems with customers’ cars than previously, and a 
lower perceptual threshold for when repairs are thought necessary. 
 The optimal design of compliance-sensitive incentives is well beyond the scope of 
this chapter.  There is a school of thought among some behavioralists that aggressive 
incentives and quotas are not only dangerous and less important to productivity than 
commonly assumed.  They crowd out conscientiousness.  Others contest that and consider 
those arrangements efficient, even as they acknowledge the compliance risk when they are 
baked into the organization’s strategic plan (for a review, see Kamenica 2012).  Given the 
time lag between revenue (now) and a compliance sanction (later if ever), attention to the 
former is fairly natural and increased all the more in the face of hyperbolic discounting of 
the future over the present.   
Executive contracts might be designed to address this through deferrals, clawbacks 
and the like, though that is certainly a contested topic.  But much of the motivation for 
wrongdoing isn’t entirely top down.  As Chuck Whitehead and Simon Sepe (2015) point 
out, risk often comes from the up-and-coming strivers, for whom mobility is important 
and hence incentive structures have to be short-term to attract the best talent.  I confess 
some pessimism that entrenched incentive structures will ever make compliance a priority 
in settings that are perceived internally as hypercompetitive, or that there is a particularly 
productive way to do this by external regulatory fiat.  The genetic structure of firms seems 
to understand that survival and success come first, and that optimal compliance is about the 
organization’s taste for risk.  Given what we said earlier about biases that promote 
competitiveness, both regulation and compliance will usually be chasing the greased pig 
from behind (Langevoort, 2016, p. 160).   
17 
 
 That goes for human resources as well.  It is probably right that good compliance is 
heavily influenced by who gets hired and who gets promoted.  And it is self-evident that 
most competitive firms don’t hire at seminaries or schools of social work in order to seek 
out the most ethically sensitive.  Nor do they seek out sociopaths, of course.  But how 
many consider the compliance implications of hiring practices that, say, seek out college-
level athletes or fraternity/sorority presidents?  That may seem merit-based and innocent 
enough, and probably not a bad heuristic in predicting employment success.  But the firm is 
also raising its aggregate testosterone level, plus whatever other traits correlate with such 
resumes.  Researchers have noted how sought-after characteristics in the business world 
like energy, self-confidence, the need for achievement and independence, can have evil 
twin pairings: aggressiveness, narcissism, ruthlessness and irresponsibility (Miller 2015). 
 Promotion practices are another subtle source of frustration.  Economists have 
modeled the internal promotion tournament at competitive firms and noted how they 
reward the overconfident risk-taker (Goel and Thakor 2008).  If we assume that risk-taking 
includes compliance risks with a significant economic upside, we can see how the path to 
the top may favor those with an extra willingness to push against regulatory demands.  If 
regulatory demands are under-enforced either systematically or at a particular time (e.g., 
when the economy is booming), the lottery wheel tilts even more in favor of the legal risk-
takers (Langevoort 2012, pp. 504-06).  If so, no matter what the official rhetoric, the tone 
at the top can degrade audibly to anyone listening carefully enough.   
4.4.  Constructive Interventions 
 The pessimism of the last subsection is sobering, and I do fear that the compliance 
function has to work hard—and use all the economic and behavioral tools at its disposal—
even to moderate the temptations to take excessive legal risks, much less eliminate them.  
But compliance efforts are crucial, in that without that, things would surely be worse.  
Behaviorally, organizational correctives are sorely needed. 
 Earlier, we said that there is much research trying to tease out when cheating 
becomes more likely than the baseline.  It also looks for the opposite, interventions that 
lessen cheating.  There are some amusing findings.  Pictures of eyes in the room, or posting 
the Ten Commandments (even as to non-believer subjects), reduce cheating (Ariely 2012, 
ch. 2).  Behavioral ethicists urge the display of ethical reminders as close to the time of 
temptation as possible, which is behind the intuition noted earlier that an oath or 
certification just before making a statement can be helpful.  Another effort looks to the 
choice architecture inside the firm to see if nudges will work—making the ethically more 
risky course of action require affirmative effort rather than be the default.10   
                                                 
10  For an experimental study showing some promise in nudging greater awareness of the effects of conflicts 
of interest, see Feldman and Halali (2015). 
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 These are low-powered interventions, to be sure. But they do help give content to 
something often invoked but otherwise ill-defined: tone at the top.  Tone can be viewed in 
terms of the bad—where senior management give off signals of disinterest or hypocrisy,11 
saying one thing but doing another.  (Ostentatious displays of wealth don’t help, or over-
claiming business travel privileges on the company jet.)   
But more positively, persistently addressing ethics and values offers the same kind 
of close-to-the-moment reminder opportunity.  How senior management and the board of 
directors interact with the ethics and compliance function, in terms of both frequency and 
expression, will be noticed, too.  And to stress a point Tom Tyler has persistently 
emphasized in his research, fair treatment of employees is key not only to good morale but 
any perception that management’s compliance expectations have legitimacy (Tyler et al. 
2008; see also Tyler 2017). 
 Organizational processes may also be addressable from a compliance and ethics 
perspective.  Decision-making usually tries to be as nimble as possible, and bureaucratic 
roadblocks—repetitive committee approvals—can be deadening.  That said, a 
psychologically savvy look at decision process and decision speed can be helpful at points 
where compliance risks lurk.12  But being more specific than this requires that we hone in 
on the particulars of the legal subject in question, competitive context and many other 
factors, beyond what we can profitably explore here.  Miriam Baer (2014) offers a useful 
sketch of architectural and policing strategies that a company might employ to target time-
inconsistency driven misbehavior, a search for pre-commitment devices that better align 
employees’ present and future selves. 
5.  Perspective 
 So in the end, what is behavioral compliance?  To be clear, it is not some new or 
different brand of compliance design, but rather an added perspective.  Just as compliance 
requires good economics skills, it requires psychological savvy as well, to help predict how 
incentives and compliance messages will be processed, construed and acted upon in the 
field.  All compliance functions and challenges should be deconstructed and thought 
through rigorously to anticipate responses and counter-responses, an effort at game theory 
in both its classical and behavioral (Camerer, 2003) forms.  The behavioral approach to 
compliance offers some concrete interventions to consider, but is mainly about doing 
conventional things (communication, surveillance, forensics) better.  
 Behavioral compliance also demands self-reflection.  As we saw, one research 
agenda in behavioral ethics looks at how people observe and react to cheating by others, 
and the role of motivations, biases and blind spots in all this.   People in the compliance 
                                                 
11   Even if the hypocritical CEO genuinely believes his own sanctimony, which is not unlikely. 
 
12   On the benefits of delay from a cognitive perspective, see Partnoy (2012). 
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field should appreciate that their own efforts are potentially biased, too.  Compliance is 
very hard, and often frustrating.  It has to fight for its own internal legitimacy, against 
pushback both blatant and subtle. Finding wrongdoing inside the firm is painful in terms of 
hard choices about self-reporting that might bring on penalties, the political difficulties of 
assigning blame, and institutional shame and anger. Those conditions can easily prompt 
self-serving or self-protective construals within the compliance function, not just outside 
it.  Given how important the job is, that risk has to be confronted openly, too, lest the 
function devolve into defensive routines and habits that make it the merely cosmetic touch-
up critics have long feared (Krawiec, 2003). 
 
 
  
20 
 
References  
 
Abdel-khalik, A. Rashad. 2014.    Prospect Theory Predictions in the Field: Risk Seekers in Settings 
of Weak Accounting Controls.   Journal of Accounting Literature, 33, 58-84 
Akerlof, George and Rachel Kranton. 2005. Identity and the Economics of Organizations.”  Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 19, 9-32. 
Ariely, Dan. 2012.  The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty (New York: Harper). 
Arlen, Jennifer and William Carney. 1992. Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: 
Theory and Evidence. University of Illinois Law Review, 1992, 691-740. 
Arlen, Jennifer and Stephan Tontrup. 2015. Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal 
Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions. Journal of Legal Studies, 44, 143-182. 
Baer, Miriam. 2014. Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud.  Florida Law Review, 66, 87-
155. 
Bartling, Bjorn and Urs Fischbacher. 2012. Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility. 
Review of Economic Studies, 79, 67-87 
Bazerman, Max H., and Francesca Gino. 2012. Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Understanding 
of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty.  Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 8, 85-114.   
Bazerman, Max and Ann Tenbrunsel. 2011. Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What’s Right and 
What to do About It (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Camerer, Colin F.  2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.  
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press). 
Carney, Dana. 2010. Powerful People are Better Liars.  Harvard Business Review, 88 (May), 32-
33.   
Carney, Dana and Malia Mason. 2010. Decision Making and Testosterone: When the Ends Justify 
the Means.  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 668-671. 
Cikara, M., Bruneau, E., Van Bavel, J.J., Saxe, R.  2014. Their pain gives us pleasure: How 
intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 55, 110-125. 
Coates, John M.  2012. The Hour between Dog and Wolf: Risk Taking, Gut Feelings and the 
Biology of Booms and Busts (New York: Penguin Press). 
21 
 
Cohn, Alain, Ernst Fehr and Michel Merechal. 2014. Business Culture and Dishonesty in the 
Banking Industry, Nature, 516, 86-89. 
Dana, Jason, Roberto Weber and Jason Kuang. 2007. Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: 
Experiments Demonstrating the Illusory Preference for Fairness, Economic Theory, 33, 
67-80. 
Darley, John. 2005. The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational 
Corruption.   Brooklyn Law Review, 70, 1177-94. 
Edelman, Lauren B. and Mark C. Suchman. 1997. The Legal Environments of Organizations,  
Annual Review of Sociology 23, 479-515. 
Engstrom.  2017.  [add cite to this volume] 
Falk, Armin, and Michael Kosfeld. 2006. The Hidden Costs of Control.   American Economic 
Review, 96, 1611-30. 
Fanto, James.  2014.  Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for Broker-
Dealers, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2014, 1121.   
Feldman, Yuval. 2014.    Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics.   In Oxford 
Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law.  (Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman, eds.  
New York: Oxford University Press). 
Feldman, Yuval, and Eliran Halali. 2015. Can We Regulate ‘Good’ People? An Exploratory Study 
of Subtle Conflict of Interest Situations.   Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536575. 
Feldman, Yuval, and Orly Lobel. 2010. The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of 
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality.   Texas Law Review, 
88, 1151-1212. 
Feldman, Yuval, and Doron Teichman. 2009.  Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?   New 
York University Law Review, 84, 980-1023. 
Free, Clinton and Pamela Murphy. 2015. The Ties that Bind: The Decision to Co-offend in Fraud.   
Contemporary Accounting Research, 32, 18-54. 
Gino, Francesca, and Max Bazerman. 2009. When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The Acceptability 
of Gradual Erosion in Others’ Unethical Behavior. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 708-19. 
Goel, Anand and Ajay Thakor. 2008. Overconfidence, CEO Selection and Corporate Governance,  
Journal of Finance, 63, 2737-84. 
22 
 
Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini. 2000. A Fine is a Price.  Journal of Legal Studies, 29, 1-17. 
Greve, Henrich, Donald Palmer and Jo-Ellen Pozner. 2010. Organizations Gone Wild: The 
Causes, Processes and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct.   Academy of 
Management Annals, 4, 53-107. 
Jia, Yuping, Laurence Van Lent and Yachang Zeng. 2014. Masculinity, Testosterone and Financial 
Misreporting.   Journal of Accounting Research, 52, 1195-1246. 
Johnson, Dominic, and James H. Fowler. 2011. The Evolution of Overconfidence.   Nature, 477 
(September 2011), 317-20. 
Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow.  (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux). 
Kamenica, Emir. 2012. Behavioral Economics and the Psychology of Incentives.    Annual Review 
of Economics, 4, 13.1-13.26. 
Killingsworth, Scott. 2012. Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance through 
Organizational Values and Culture. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 25, 961-87. 
Kouchaki, Maryam, Kristin Smith-Crowe, Arthur Brief and Carlos Sousa. 2013.  Seeing Green: 
Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes.   
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 121, 53-61. 
Kluver, Jesse, Rebecca Frazier and Jonathan Haidt. 2014. Behavioral Ethics for Homo Economicus, 
Homo Heuristicus and Homo Duplex.   Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 123, 150-58. 
Krawiec, Kimberly. 2003. Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance.   
Washington University Law Quarterly, 81, 487-544. 
Langevoort, Donald C.  2016.   Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Corporations, Wall Street and the 
Dilemmas of Investor Protection.  (New York: Oxford University Press).    
Langevoort, Donald C.  2012. Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and 
the Financial Crisis.   Wisconsin Law Review, 2012, 495-519. 
Langevoort, Donald C.  2002. Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance 
with Law.   Columbia Business Law Review, 2002, 71-117. 
Lo, Andrew. 2016. The Gordon Gekko Effect: The Role of Culture in the Financial Industry. 
Economic Policy Review, 22, 17-42. 
23 
 
Loewenstein, George, Daylian Cain and Sunita Sah. 2011. The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and 
Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest.   American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings, 101, 423-28. 
MacLean, Tammy and Michael Benham. 2010. The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship 
Between Compliance Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions and Institutionalized Misconduct.   
Academy of Management Journal, 53, 1499-1520. 
Malhotra, Deepak. 2010. The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation 
and Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 111, 139-46. 
Mayer, David, Samir Nurmohamed, Linda Klebe Treviño, Debra Shapiro and Marshall Schminke. 
2013. Encouraging Employees to Report Misconduct Internally: It Takes a Village.   
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 121, 89-103. 
Miller, Danny. 2015. A Downside to the Entrepreneurial Personality?, Entrepreneurship: Theory 
and Practice, 39, 1-8.  
Miller, Geoffrey, and Gerald Rosenfeld. 2010. Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in 
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008.   Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy, 33, 807-40. 
Ordóñez, Lisa. D., Schweitzer, M. E., Galinsky, A. D., & Bazerman, M. H.  2009.   Goals Gone Wild: 
The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting, Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23, 82-87. 
Paharia, Neeru, Karim Kassam, Joshua Greene and Max Bazerman. 2009. Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The 
Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
109; 134-41. 
Partnoy, Frank. 2012. Wait: The Art and Science of Delay (New York: Public Affairs).  
Pierce, Jason, Gavin Kildoff, Adam Galinsky and Niro Sivaniathan. 2013.  From Glue to Gasoline: 
How Competition Turns Perspective Takers Unethical.   Psychological Science, 20, 1-9. 
Rick, Scott and George Loewenstein. 2008. Hypermotivation.   Journal of Marketing Research, 
45, 645-48. 
Rogers, Todd, Richard Zeckhauser, Francesca Gino, Maurice Schweitzer and Mike Norton. 2014.    
Artful Paltering: The Risks and Rewards of Using Truthful Statements to Mislead Others.   
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2528625.   
Sapienza, Paulo, Luigi Zingales and D. Maestripieri. 2009. Gender Differences in Financial Risk 
Aversion and Career Choices are Influenced by Testosterone.   Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 106, 15268-73. 
24 
 
Schrand, Catherine, and Sarah Zechman. 2012. Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope 
to Financial Misreporting.   Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15, 311-29. 
Sharot, Tali. 2011.  The Optimism Bias.  Current Biology, 21, R941-945. 
Sokol, Daniel. 2014. Policing the Firm.   Notre Dame Law Review, 91, 785-848. 
Staw, Barry. 1976. Knee Deep in Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen 
Course of Action. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 16, 27-44. 
Sumanth, John J., Mayer, David M., & Kay, V. S.  2011.  Why good guys finish last: The role of 
justification motives, cognition, and emotion in predicting retaliation against 
whistleblowers. Organizational Psychology Review, 1, 165-184. 
Tenbrunsel, Ann, and David Messick. 2004. Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in 
Unethical Behavior. Social Justice Research, 17, 223. 
Tenbrunsel, Ann and David Messick. 1999. Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames and 
Cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 684. 
Tetlock, Philip E.  2000. Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and 
Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?   Administrative Law Quarterly, 45, 293-
328. 
Treviño, Linda Klebe, and Gary Weaver, David Gibson and Barbara Toffler. 1999.    Managing 
Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts.   California Management 
Review, 41, 131-51. 
 Treviño, Linda Klebe,  Niki A. den Niewuwenboer, Geln E. Kreiner and Derron Bishop. 2014a.  
Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study of Legitimacy Work among Ethics 
and Compliance Officers. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 123, 
186-205. 
Treviño, Linda Klebe, Niki A. den Nieuwenboer, and Jennifer Kish-Gephart. 2014b.    (U)nethical 
Behavior in Organizations. Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 635-60. 
Trivers, Robert. 2011. Deceit and Self-Deception: Fooling Yourself the Better to Fool Others 
(New York: Allen Lane). 
Tyler, Tom.  2017.  Psychology and the Deterrence of Corporate Crime, in this volume. 
Tyler, Tom, John Dienhart and Terry Thomas. 2008. The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: 
Building Values-based Cultures. California Management Review, 50, 31-51. 
25 
 
Utset, Manuel. 2013. Corporate Actors, Corporate Crime and Time Inconsistent Preferences. 
Virginia Journal of Criminal Law, 1, 265-328. 
Van Staveren, Irene. 2014. The Lehman Sisters Hyopothesis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 38, 
995-1014. 
Waytz, Adam, James Dungan and Liane Young. 2013. The Whistleblower’s Dilemma and the 
Fairness-Loyalty Tradeoff. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 1027-33. 
Welsh, David and Lisa Ordóñez. 2014.  The Dark Side of Consecutive High Performance Goals: 
Linking Goal Setting, Depletion and Unethical Behavior. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 121, 79-89. 
Welsh, David, Lisa Ordóñez, Diedre Snyder and Michael Christian. 2015. The slippery slope: A self-
regulatory examination of the cumulative effect of minor ethical transgressions. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 100, 114-27.  
Whitehead, Charles, and Simon Sepe. 2015.  Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation and Competition. 
Cornell Law Review, 100, 655-702. 
 
 
